Increased uptake of variable renewable generation and further electrification of energy demand necessitate efficient coordination of flexible demand resources to make most efficient use of power system assets. Flexible electrical loads are typically small, numerous, heterogeneous and owned by self-interested agents. Considering the multi-temporal nature of flexibility and the uncertainty involved, scheduling them is a complex task. This paper proposes a forecast-mediated real-time market-based control approach (F-MBC) for cost minimizing coordination of uninterruptible time-shiftable (i.e. deferrable) loads. F-MBC is scalable, privacy preserving, and usable by device agents with small computational power. Moreover, F-MBC is proven to overcome the challenge of mutually conflicting decisions from equivalent devices. Simulations in a simplified but challenging case study show that F-MBC produces near-optimal behaviour over multiple time-steps.
Introduction
Power systems have seen an increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as distributed generators, flexible demand, and small-scale renewable generation. This trend has significant impacts on the network, leading to congestion, reduced network utilization, and even instability or system inoperability at the distribution level [1] . Consequently, the transition to future power systems requires either a great deal of investment in grid reinforcement, or efficient use of flexibility from DERs through coordination.
Optimal coordination among DERs is a complex multidimensional problem, especially in settings with small, numerous, heterogeneous DERs owned by self-interested agents. The complexity is further amplified by inter-temporal constraints introduced by shifting energy consumption and uncertainties in DER usage patterns and renewable-based generation. A suitable coordination approach for such a setting is required to be simple and usable by agents with small computational power [2] numerous DERs, and privacy preserving since the DERs being considered are owned by self-interested agents.
This problem has been considered in a number of settings, including electric vehicle charging [3] , deferrable loads such as white goods appliances, and thermostatically controlled loads. Most control techniques for flexible demand are based either on centralized coordination, top-down control, or price response [4, 5] . Centralized and top-down approaches (e.g. [6] ) are not suitable when considering privacy, autonomy, and scalability constraints, whereas completely decentralized approaches relying on one-way communication (e.g. price response [7, 8] ) have uncertain realized system response. A comprehensive review of advantages and disadvantages of control approaches can be found in [9] .
Market-based Control
A natural fit for the problem of coordinating self-interested DERs is transactive control, which refers to control approaches which perform coordination and control tasks by using economic incentive signaling to exchange information about generation, consumption, constraints, and responsiveness of assets over dynamic, real-time forecasting periods [10] . Market-based control (MBC) describes a class of transactive control algorithms that take the form of a mediated market [11] . In an attempt to find a middle way between the aforementioned approaches, this paradigm provides simultaneously a degree of privacy, autonomy, certainty, and openness compared to the aforementioned approaches [5, 9] . However, when used for coordination among numerous DERs, over multiple time-steps and taking into account uncertainty, MBC approaches rapidly grow in complexity, limiting their scalability and practical feasibility. For example, multi-settlement markets, such as in [12, 13] require complex bid formulation algorithms, which is especially hard for devices with small computational power [2] . Accounting for uncertainty similarly increases complexity, as is evident in the hierarchical MBC approach in [14] . In [15, 16] , iterative approaches for coordination were proposed. An iterative approach based on Mean-field games was proposed in [17] . However, [18] indicates iterative approaches are not suitable for real-time operations due to uncertain convergence time and dependence on initial conditions. The same logic applies for negotiation approaches such as in [19] . On the other hand, approaches based on the assumption of cooperative agents [20, 21, 22] are not suitable for the settings with self-interested agents.
Real-time Market-based Control
In this paper, we use the term "Real-time market-based control (RTMBC)" to describe a simple and scalable form of MBC. In RTMBC, DERs are represented by autonomous agents participating in a spot power market. The market is cleared for the upcoming time-step (i.e. in real time) by means of a double auction. The use of decentralized decision making and a centralized one-shot market clearing simplifies the whole process. Device level constraints and objectives are taken into account in the process of bid/offer formulation. An example of such approach can be seen in [9] .
Despite these beneficial properties, in practice RTMBC often leads to poor performance over multiple time-steps due to uncertainty, inter-temporal constraints of uninterruptible devices, and mutually-conflicting decisions that arise from decentralization and the self-interested behaviour of agents [23, 24, 18] . For example, in [25] the effect of such behaviour is shown to lead to exhaustion of flexibility in the system. An approach for coordination among thermostatically controlled loads was presented in [26] . This was further studied in [23] where it was found prone to load synchronization and power oscillations. Agents submitting similar bids (i.e. Bulk switching), and clustering at lower price periods are phenomena that occur when optimal decisions from the agents' perspective conflict and lead to sub-optimal outcomes both at the agent level and system level. This is most apparent in case of identical devices given the same information. Therefore, identical devices pose a challenge to many coordination approaches.
Summary of contributions
In this paper, we aim at solving the problem of scheduling a set of uninterruptible deferrable loads over multiple time-steps to minimize generation cost taking into account uncertainty. We will refer to this as the "optimal coordination problem". To achieve this, we propose the forecastmediated market-based control approach (F-MBC). F-MBC relies on decentralized bid formulation and centralized oneshot market clearing to coordinate among these devices. The proposed approach is scalable and preserves end-user privacy and autonomy. It relies on probabilistic forecasts to account for uncertainty in renewable-based generation and DER usage patterns. Moreover, we design a lowcomplexity Markov decision process(MDP) based optimal bidding algorithm for deferrable loads, which is usable by a device with limited computational power (e.g. embedded systems) to formulate a bid that minimizes its own expected cost. We show that the combination of this and probabilistic reference prices solves the problem of mutually-conflicting decisions among identical devices; that is, two identical device agents with different deadlines will never have the same bid. This is shown mathematically in Section 2. Additionally, we design a tie-breaking mechanism to assist in market clearing when several agents are indifferent between different actions at the marketclearing price. We show by simulation that the proposed F-MBC approach achieves near-optimal system level performance over multiple time-steps (i.e. minimizes overall generation cost) in Section 3.
Methodology
Consider a setting of uninterruptible deferrable loads, with deadlines set by their respective owners. This resembles a collection of devices such as irrigation pumps, greenhouse lighting, or home appliances such as washing machines, dryers, etc. [27, 28] . We assume that each of the deferrable loads acts in its economic best interest, minimizing its consumption cost subject to device level constraints (e.g. deadline, uninterruptibility).
The challenge is to design a scheme that fully or approximately solves the optimal coordination problem, scheduling the flexible demand over multiple discrete time-steps with the objective of minimizing the overall generation cost. It is important to note that the global cost minimization is equivalent to social welfare maximization since the total energy demand (and, therefore, the utility) is fixed. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper we will just use the term "optimal coordination".
To achieve this, we rely on the idea of "self-fulfilling forecasts". As illustrated in 1, F-MBC comprises three types of autonomous agents; A facilitator, an auctioneer, and a device agent per flexible device. The facilitator is a central entity which, in general, does not have access to private information (e.g. deadlines, cycle durations) and cannot directly control the devices. This is a sensible assumption in settings where DERs are small, numerous and owned by self-interested agents. Such an approach is similar to the vision of layered decentralized optimization architecture in [29] . The facilitator utilizes aggregate histori-cal information, forecasts, behaviour patterns, and system models to estimate an "offline optimal" solution to the optimal coordination problem. Some examples of techniques to solve such a problem can be found in [30, 31, 32] . The resulting "estimate" schedule is probabilistic and results in a probabilistic reference price for each time-step (in the form of a probability distribution), thus taking into account uncertainty. The probabilistic reference prices are then communicated to the flexible demand agents which use this information for bid formulation. Device agents formulate their respective bids in a self-interested manner (i.e. minimizing the expected cost incurred by the agent). A device agent takes into account local deadline and uninterruptibility constraints in addition to the probabilistic reference prices provided by the facilitator. Bids are then submitted to a central auctioneer in the form of a demand function. Finally, an allocation is made through a one-shot double auction and an additional tie breaking mechanism. The facilitator updates the "estimate" for the future taking into account the market outcome which results in an updated probabilistic reference price signal. The whole process is repeated for every time-step.
It is noteworthy here that aggregation of bids can be done centrally or through hierarchical aggregation of bid functions. This means that the complexity of aggregating bids is linear, at worst, or logarithmic, at best, when the system is organized as a binary tree. This, combined with decentralized bid optimization, one-shot market clearing and the non-iterative nature of the approach make is scalable and simple to implement even in scenarios where agents have small computational power. Moreover, the outcome of this process is a near-optimal system-level behaviour over multiple time-steps. The resulting coordination approximates the "offline optimal coordination" estimated a priori, so the probabilistic reference prices can be considered "self-fulfilling".
Mathematical Framework
Consider a scheduling horizon consisting of the set of discrete time steps T = {1, . . . , T} with fixed intervals ∆t. The subscript t will be used to refer both to the instant t as well as the interval that immediately follows, depending on the context. The system comprises a set A of uninterruptible deferrable devices owned by self-interested consumers. Each device is represented by an agent a defined by a deadline, duration and a power consumption
The system also has inflexible demand, zero-cost renewable generation that can be curtailed, and flexible generation with a non-decreasing marginal cost m t (P ). An optimal coordination denotes the allocation of flexible devices over the scheduling horizon, such that the overall generation cost is minimized. This is subject to system-level constraints (i.e. supply/demand matching, flexible generation limits), and agent-level constraints (i.e. deadlines, uninterruptibility). 
MDP-based Optimal Bidding
At this point, we describe how an agent may compute and optimize its bid given the probabilistic reference prices supplied by the facilitator. We represent these prices, having the form of time-dependent probability distributions, by independent random variables X t with bounded expectation E(X t ) =x t < ∞. Each device agent aims at minimizing its expected cost out of self-interest. For that, we develop a MDP model for optimal bidding which consists of a state space, action space and a set of rewards/costs. We show that the MDP-based bidding algorithm minimizes the expected cost for the device (i.e. optimal in expectation) given the available information (i.e. probabilistic price reference) and the assumption that a single device is a price taker. For an uninterruptible deferrable device, the action space only consists of two actions on, off. The state consists of a possible realization of the price, and the status (s a t ) of the device, where s a t = 0 for a device that has not started yet (i.e. waiting), s a t = {1, . . . , D a − 1} for a device that has started (i.e. running), and s a t = D for a device that has run for D time-steps (i.e. finished).
If the uninterruptible device a switches from the waiting to the running state at time t with a market clearing price x t , its expected total running cost is a combination of the cost of starting at t with a price of x t , and the sum of the expected costs for the remainder of the device's cycle,
The agent aims to minimize its running cost. It does so by, at each time step, submitting a bid function b a t (x), defined by a threshold pricex a t . The definition of an optimal bid function is given below. Theorem 1. For a sequence of independent reference prices X t with bounded expectation, agent a minimizes its expected running cost by submitting the threshold-based bid function b a t (x), where
and C * a t is the optimal expected cost at t, which is recursively defined in reverse order for
Proof. In order for b a t (x) to be optimal, the optimal action for an agent must be on if the clearing price x t is smaller than or equal to the threshold bidx • At time-step t = d a − D a , a waiting device a must switch to the running state to meet the deadline, so the optimal action is on irrespective of the clearing price (i.e.x a t = ∞). The expected cost associated with starting immediately is therefore also optimal:
• At time-steps t < d a − D a , if a has not started yet, the action on is optimal when the expected cost for switching on is less than the expected cost for waiting and acting optimally at
, only off is optimal. Therefore, the threshold z (5) is derived from the equality C s,a t (x a t ) = C * a t+1 . When the equality holds, agent a is indifferent between starting and waiting.
Given the existence of optimal threshold bidsx a t and (6), the optimal expected cost (7) for t < d a − D a follows by backwards induction.
In the following, we consider how different deadlines impact the bids of otherwise identical agents. Identical devices pose a challenge due to the increased possibility for synchronised and conflicting decisions [23, 24, 18, 25, 26] . We argue that F-MBC provides a natural way to resolve such conflicts.
In the proofs, we shall assume that at any time, the forecast price has a non-zero probability to exceed the largest finite threshold price: Pr(X t
They are weakly deadline-ordered if their deadlines satisfy
Lemma 2. A collection of n rapid-starting, identical, deadlineordered devices that is in the waiting state at time t, operating under the optimal MDP policy, will bid with a strictly decreasing sequence of threshold prices:
A weakly deadline-ordered collection will bid with a non-increasing sequence of threshold prices:
Theorem 3. A collection of n rapid-starting, identical, deadline-ordered devices, operating under the optimal MDP policy, will start (and complete) in order of their deadlines.
Proof. Prior to the first auction, all agents are in the waiting state. In the auction, agents with a threshold bid exceeding (and sometimes including) the clearing price transition to the running state. Lemma 2 guarantees that these are agents with the earliest deadlines. This process is repeated for subsequent auctions with devices that have not started yet.
Market Clearing and Tie Breaking
The market is cleared via a one-shot double auction for each time-step. We assume that generation truthfully reveals its marginal cost function. The aggregate offer function accounts for flexible generation and inflexible generation in the upcoming time-step. Device agents submit their bids only for the upcoming time-step. The aggregate bid function includes inflexible demand and the bids submitted by flexible demand. The market is cleared at time-step t at the price x t at which supply meets demand. Then, the market-clearing price is communicated to device agents which determine their local control actions based on their earlier submitted bids.
Although Figure 2 . A large step in the aggregate bid can cause difficulties in market clearing (i.e. bulk switching). To address this issue, we introduce a tie breaking mechanism among such agents.
The tie breaking mechanism determines which of the tied agents can start at the current time-step and which will wait for a later time-step. Each agent submits a random number ρ a along with its bid. When the auctioneer detects a tie situation, it determines a value ρ * so that only bids with ρ a ≤ ρ * will be accepted. ρ * is chosen such that demand most closely approximates the supply at the clearing price x t .
Due to the discrete nature of the loads, an exact match may not be found. In such a case, the bid of the marginal device a is accepted with probability γ P a , where γ is the difference between the supply at x t and the demand without the marginal device. Agents will be charged the market clearing price x t while generation should supply at a slightly higher (lower) set-point, and is paid accordingly. This results in a budget imbalance that vanishes in expectation (i.e. averages to zero in the long term). This is illustrated in Figure 2 .
We note that the random tie breaking mechanism does not affect optimality or fairness as it is only used to break ties among agents with bids that are equal to the market clearing price. Agents are indifferent between starting and waiting at their bid price, so those who are not allocated will wait for a later time-step and eventually incur the same expected cost as those which were allocated. Therefore, they have no incentive to game the tie-breaking mechanism. Also, because ρ a is generated locally, tie breaking can be implemented using a broadcast of ρ * . The alternative, where ρ a is determined by the auctioneer, would require a targeted message to each device.
Alignment of Optimal Coordination and Self Interest
According to the previously stated definition of the optimal coordination problem, our objective is to steer the cluster of flexible devices towards an optimal systemlevel behaviour (i.e. total generation cost minimization). To guarantee a stable optimum, it is necessary that the optimal coordination corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. This guarantees that it is in the best interest of the device agents not to deviate from such behaviour. Therefore, we show that the global cost minimizing solution indeed corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. To analyse the potential for F-MBC to achieve optimal system-level behaviour, we first consider the schedule achieved by a clairvoyant optimizer with complete information. We give conditions under which this schedule corresponds to the outcome of a Nash equilibrium, i.e. agents cannot benefit by deviating from the starting time-step allocated by the central optimizer. These results indicate that the central F-MBC facilitator should aim to estimate the prices that correspond to such a system optimal allocation, so that devices are incentivised to realise the reference prices.
We consider a cost-optimal allocation of flexible devices, characterized by an aggregate load profile P * t and a starting time t a for each flexible device a, summarized as S = ({P * t } t=1:T , {t a } a=1:A ). Without loss of generality, in the following we take the perspective of an arbitrary deferrable device agent a that has a duration D and uninterruptible consumption pattern {P a 0 , . . . , P a D−1 }, which is scheduled to start at t = t a under the cost-optimal allocation. No assumptions are made about the properties of other flexible loads. Let P ¬a t be the cost-optimal load pattern P * t minus the consumption of device a starting at t a , and m t (P ) be the monotone increasing function in P which represents the marginal cost of a unit of generation at generation level P and time t. The cost to the system of running device a at time t is
The fact that the starting time t a is optimal with respect to overall system cost, implies that
Switching from the system perspective to that of an individual , we assume that the a pays a price equal to the marginal cost of energy. The total price paid by agent a starting at t is
The allocation S is a Nash equilibrium if for each agent a,
In the following, we identify conditions where global costoptimality (9) implies the Nash equilibrium condition (11).
Theorem 4. If m t (P )
is an affine function with constant slope dm t (P )/dP = c, ∀t, then S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Evaluating the integral in (8) using the affine structure of m t (P ) yields
Because the last term does not depend on t or P * , (9) implies (11) and S is a NE.
Note that m t (P ) does not need to be strictly affine with slope c for all P , but only for those marginal power levels that are accessible by flexible devices. This is the case in the example in Section 3.
Definition 2. The allocation S is a δ-relaxed Nash equilibrium if the condition (11) is replaced by the weaker condition
The δ-relaxed Nash equilibrium is effectively a Nash equilibrium for devices that are insensitive to relative price differentials of size δ. Clearly, it converges to a regular Nash equilibrium in the limit δ ↓ 0. We note that this is closely related to the concept of an ε-equilibrium [33] . Theorem 5. If there exists an ε < 1 so that, (14) then S is a δ-relaxed Nash equilibrium with δ = ε/(1 − ε)
Proof. From definitions (8), (10), (14) and the fact that m t (P ) is non-decreasing, it follows that
By chaining the first inequality (for t = t a ) with (9) and the second inequality, we obtain
Substitution of δ = ε/(1 − ε) and comparison with (13) completes the proof. Corollary 6. In the limit where agents are price takers (individually), S is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. When agents are price takers, this implies that Theorem 5 applies with the limit ε ↓ 0. Therefore, δ ↓ 0 in (13) and the stronger condition (11) holds.
This result effectively extends the Nash equilibrium to to all sufficiently large systems with continuous marginal cost functions. Note that the notion of individual device agents being price takers does not preclude devices from collectively influencing prices significantly.
Experimental analysis
Using simulations, we illustrate two features of the proposed F-MBC approach. First, we show that F-MBC performance is near-optimal over multiple time-steps when price uncertainty is negligible (consistency). Second, we analyze the robustness of the solution to varying amounts of uncertainty in price forecasts in order to qualify the need for accurate estimation of reference prices.
Case Study Description
For this case study, we consider a system with identical deferrable loads. This represents a particularly challenging scenario, due to a high probability of ties occurring and a lumpiness of loads that does not permit full 'valley filling' of the solution. A full day (24 hours, starting at 21:00) was simulated with market clearing at 5 min time steps. A fixed horizon at 20:55 the next day was used for forecasting and bid formation. The system included 1200 deferrable loads, with a duration of 1 h and fixed consumption of 2 kW each. Deadlines were distributed in two clusters of 600 devices, normally distributed with a standard deviation of 1 hour around 7:00 in the early morning and 17:00 in the early evening, and rounded to the nearest 5 min time-step. Inflexible demand was modelled using load data from [34] aggregated and scaled to a peak of 350 kW. Wind generation with a peak of 500 kW was generated using [35] and a simple wind turbine model that approximates the performance of a 100 kW wind turbine [36], scaled to 500 kW. The simulation input data can be seen in Figure 3 . Simulations were performed in Matlab.
Flexible generation was represented by a time-independent, linearly increasing marginal cost function
where P g is the power generated by the flexible generator fleet and k = 500 kW 2 min, with arbitrary units for currency. With this choice, the total cost of generation (wind and flexible generation), has an affine marginal cost, provided that P g > 0. Therefore, it follows from Theorem 4 that the device schedule from a clairvoyant optimizer with complete information corresponds to the outcome of a Nash equilibrium. 
Simulating the Facilitator: Clairvoyance and complete control
To establish the potential of F-MBC as a coordination mechanism via simulations, we first identify the theoretical optimal coordination that can be obtained only by a clairvoyant optimizer with complete control. Accordingly, we obtain optimal reference prices that reflect an optimal allocation of demand using perfect foresight. Due to our selection of identical, fixed consumption devices, this can be done by solving the mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP) that finds the optimal number of devices to start at each time-step σ t , and optimal flexible power generation for each time-step P g t such that the total generation cost over multiple time-steps is minimized:
subject to, ∀t ∈ T ,
where at time-step t, φ d (t) is the number of devices with deadlines before or at t, P l t is power consumption by inflexible load, P r t is the power from renewable sources, o t is the number of devices running at t. Generator limits and supply/demand matching constraints are represented by (19) and (20) , respectively. It is assumed that renewable generation is curtailed when a generation surplus occurs. The number of device start-ups to any time-step t must be at least equal to the number of devices which have a deadline before or at t + D, and for the last time periods it should be exactly the total number of devices with a deadline before T . This is represented by (21)- (22) . Device uninterruptibility is ensured by (23)- (24) . Combined, (21)- (24) guarantee that devices will not miss their respective deadlines. By solving the MIQP, a cost-optimal system load profile is obtained, which corresponds to a set of reference prices x * t ∀t ∈ T . While the reference solution here does not account for specific allocation for each agent, one realization of the reference schedule can be achieved by giving priority to devices according to their proximity to their respective deadlines, with ties being broken randomly, and assuming that devices do not switch off until their cycle (duration) is complete. The optimization was repeated after each market clearing to account for deviations from the previous reference solution, to effectively generate an "up-to-date" forecast at each time step.
Simulating the Facilitator: bounded information and
Uncertainty As previously established, probabilistic reference prices are required. In reality, the facilitator would provide probabilistic reference prices that depend on actual forecasts and information used in generating the reference. Instead, for simulation purposes, probabilistic price forecasts were generated by adding noise to the deterministic reference prices x * t as follows. It was assumed that uncertainties are exogenous and independent for each time-step, and forecast prices at each time-step are log-normally distributed, with a standard deviation that increases with time. The standard deviation of the price X t as forecast at t ′ ≤ t is parametrised by the day-ahead uncertainty ν 24h as
Moreover, forecasting errors were simulated by adjusting the mean of the log-normal forecasts: the expected pricesx t were sampled from the log-normal distribution with mean x * t and standard deviation SD t . The values x t , SD t ∀t ∈ T were communicated to agents to be used for bid formulation. generation cost in this case is 0.0803 % compared to the reference solution.
Results
Moreover, the centre panel shows the approximate 'valley filling' behaviour of the solution, especially compared to the system without flexible demand (dotted line). We note that perfect flattening of flexible power generation is not feasible due to the extended run time (1 hour, i.e. 12 time steps) of loads. In the bottom panel, devices are observed to avoid starting at times with higher realised costs and fill the periods with lower realised cost.
To evaluate the effect of forecast uncertainty on the performance of the F-MBC approach, we vary ν 24h from 10
to 1 (i.e. 100%). Figure 5 shows the results of 20 independent simulation runs for each value of ν 24h . The top panel shows the distribution of realised cost of flexible generation, compared with the reference solution. It demonstrates nearoptimal performance even for significant uncertainties in forecast prices.
The middle panel compares the individual payments made by device agents (1200 × 20 for each value of ν 24h ) against the payments under the reference schedule. For forecast uncertainties up to 10%, these are approximately zero-mean, so that devices are on average as well off using the F-MBC coordination scheme as under the Nash equilibrium. Finally, the bottom panel depicts the distribution of regret that device agents have as a result of F-MBC (i.e. the difference between the actual price paid and the lowest possible price in retrospect). The positive values indicate small deviations from a Nash equilibrium. However, the computed regret can only be used to generate cost savings individually: collectively, devices would quickly equalise price savings, as is evidenced by the small system cost deviations in the top panel.
Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper we considered a setting of uninterruptible deferrable devices with deadlines set by their respective owners. Using an aggregate demand forecast by a central facilitator, the F-MBC approach provides a simple and scalable means of DER coordination. The proposed mechanism can be implemented using only broadcasts from the auctioneer to all the devices, significantly reducing implementation complexity. Moreover, the information in these broadcasts only concerns public information. The bidding algorithm was shown to automatically resolve mutuallyconflicting decisions between devices with different deadlines and a tie breaking procedure was proposed to resolve conflicts between indifferent devices. It was shown by simulation that near-optimal performance can be attained by a clairvoyant facilitator, establishing the consistency of the approach. Moreover, an analysis of the sensitivity to price forecast uncertainty demonstrates the robustness of the approach. It was able to achieve good system-level and device-level performance across an extended horizon, making use of simple agent logic and single-period market clearing.
This paper has introduced the F-MBC concept and established its desirable properties in a limited set of applications, thus laying the groundwork for various generalizations. Relevant extensions for future work are the inclusion of heterogeneous sets of deferrable loads, interruptible loads and continuously controllable loads. In addition, machine learning approaches could be used to generate the forecasts, instead of the stylized approach used here, and performance under the influence of external noise (e.g. uncertain wind power output) would be relevant to investigate to better understand the behaviour of F-MBC in practice. Combining (A.6), (A.7) yields the desired result C * 1 t > C * 2 t .
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider two identical, deadlineordered agents in the waiting state. The ordering of threshold pricesx 1 t >x 2 t follows from (5) , provided that C * 1 t+1 > C * 2 t+1 . The latter condition is guaranteed by Lemma 7 and induction using Lemma 8. Because this holds for any two agents, it also holds for the entire collection. The weakly ordered result follows by considering agents with equal deadlines. Because such devices are indistinguishable (other aspects were already identical), symmetry requires that their threshold bids are identical.
